PREFACE.
Operational art is a vital link between the national and theater strategic objective and tactical combat. It deals chiefly with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting and sustaining major operations and campaigns. The very essence of operational art is to win decisively ~ achieving the strategic aim, while avoiding a costly attrition war. 1 Implied in this definition is the importance of the role of the commander, for it can be argued that the most critical element of operational art deals with operational leadership. The operational commander is responsible for developing an operational vision that will achieve the strategic aim. In short, operational art challenges the commander to consider the ends he must achieve, the ways to achieve those ends, and how to use the means available to him.
Why are some commanders successful in this challenge while others are not? Is the study of operational leadership even worthwhile, given the myriad of intangible factors involved? The answer is yes; the study of great leaders can illuminate the qualities that contribute to military victory. Although studying great leaders will uncover a diversity of characteristics and methods, the thesis of this paper is that there is an identifiable set of personal leadership qualities that successful operational commanders possess in common. These qualities may be broadly grouped as operational thinking, execution of the operational plan, and the intangible character traits of the commander. This paper will attempt to identify the essential qualities of operational leadership by analyzing the style and methods of General Heinz Guderian.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.
The operational leader must have the rare gift of thinking broadly and understanding how each action fits into the overall design so as to accomplish strategic or operational goals. Accurately analyzing current events combined with anticipating future events is vital to success in any major operation or campaign. Utilizing operational thinking, a leader can develop operational vision -an ability to understand how operational-level activities fit into the larger, strategic picture.
It is through the commander's operational thinking that the appropriate operational design is produced. This thinking is focused on operational objectives, centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, culminating points, decisive points, and the lines of operation. The successful commander is also able to formulate a vision of the end state. After conceptualizing the end state, he must provide his organization with a clear sense of direction, and inspire his subordinates to strive to reach that goal. It is critical that the operational commander impart to his subordinates his personal "roadmap" to victory. He must also provide the ways and means for achieving victory. 5 In addition, the commander must establish a command and control organization that provides for simplicity, clarity, unity of command, and delegation of authority to permit decentralized execution.
During the execution of a major operation or campaign, the operational commander must be able to read events as they unfold on the battlefield. His skill in doing this affects the decisions he makes and, thus, influences the overall accomplishment of the operation. This skill also allows the commander to maintain the initiative and provides him an opportunity to respond quickly, and flexibly to the fluid nature of the battlefield. The operational commander must continually assess the battlefield in order to establish courses of action that shape his area of operations to ensure reaching the objective. The commander may influence the outcome by commitment of operational reserves, obtaining additional forces, changing the priority of effort, and accepting risk to ensure sufficient strength at the decisive point. In retrospect, Guderian's assignment to the Truppenamt helped him in two ways.
First, it required him to understand the historical and contemporary use of armored and motorized forces, thereby making him the German army's defacto expert on the subject.
Second, teaching and writing played an important role in Guderian's conception, development, and dissemination of armored and motorized warfare doctrine for a future war. It is ironic that by the end of the 1920's Guderian was officially acknowledged as a leading expert on tank tactics and he had yet to set foot in a tank.
Although Germany lacked tanks, Guderian recognized that foreign developments in tank technology proved that tanks possessed the speed and range to be considered not Guderian's own XIX Corps, which contained one panzer and two motorized infantry divisions, played an important role in the overwhelming defeat of Poland. It advanced in the north from Pomerania to the Vistula river and cut off enemy forces in the Polish corridor. Guderian, never one to lead from behind, put himself in an armored command vehicle and accompanied the leading panzer formations. This enabled him to maintain contact with his Corps headquarters and with his subordinate commanders.
Guderian was aware that, since Napoleon and the advent of large armies, the tendency was for commanders to lead from the rear. The reasoning was that from this vantage point the commander could survey the entire battlefield. In this new age of fast, deeppenetrating mobile warfare, however, Guderian promoted the idea that commanders must accompany the lead elements of the blitz. Guderian wrote after the war that a commander should be located where he could personally see what was going on and receive directly the reports of his reconnaissance units. From this vantage point, he was able to make decisions and give orders rapidly. "The commander must always be in front of his men, otherwise he loses all possibility of leadership. The soldier wants to be able to see his general himself."
In order to ensure that lateral and rearward communications and liaisons were maintained, and that his orders were transmitted to all concerned, he reorganized his staff. Guderian separated his staff into a forward echelon, which accompanied the commander, and a rear echelon, for the transmission of orders and messages to the flanks and to the rear. Guderian kept the forward or command staff echelon small and mobile so that it could maintain itself on the battlefield. To accomplish this, Guderian was one of the first to mount his command staff in armored vehicles, equipping them with the latest radios and encryption devices. He also developed a "command language"
for armored units to ensure brevity and clarity for passing orders. 21 Guderian's time as a signals officer gave him these insights. Guderian created not only a new combat arm, but also capitalized on new technologies. He proved he was not only a theorist, but a practical officer highly versed in all aspects of active soldiering as well.
In the Polish Campaign, Guderian demonstrated the potential advantage of tank forces. Guderian concentrated his armor up front to achieve penetration at the The German high command did not support the Manstein plan. Manstein thus approached the only man in Germany who could verify the feasibility of getting tanks through the narrow, twisting roads of the Ardennes; that man was Heinz Guderian.
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Manstein simply assumed that it was possible to maneuver tanks through the Ardennes forest. Guderian remembered the terrain from the First World War and thought it was possible to move and supply his armored and motorized forces through this hilly terrain.
Although the major designer of the Sickle Plan, Manstein was relegated to commanding an infantry corps during the campaign. The major role in executing the plan was given to
Guderian.
Guderian became a leading advocate of the "Sickle Plan" during a series of war games in February 1940. He proposed that his corps (XIX Panzer Corps of Army Group A) cross the Meuse river near Sedan and then drive to Amiens on the Somme river, 120 miles to the west. Senior members of the General Staff strongly disagreed with him.
They suggested that Guderian's tanks might be able to make a bridgehead over the Attacking through the Ardennes involved great risk. This suited Guderian's personality and leadership style perfectly. A consummate risk-taker, he was "too well 25 Guderian, Panzer Leader. 90. trained and expert in the handling of armor to be foolhardy." 26 Guderian proved to his detractors that he was at his best when handling aggressive operations.
Guderian carried the main part of the campaign. His three panzer divisions, with more than 300 tanks apiece, crossed 60 miles through the tough, steep terrain of the Ardennes forest and over the river Meuse at Sedan before the Allies, and most"of the German General Staff, realized that he had pulled off the impossible; Guderian drove his forces through the "impassable" Ardennes.
In his drive to the channel coast, it is accurate to say that Guderian faced as much opposition from his own superiors as he did from the Allies. When Guderian had reached the Meuse, the General Staff was so riveted on what the tactical challenge of crossing the Meuse that they lost sight of the overall goal, the Allied defeat. 27 The German high command accepted securing the bridgehead as an end in itself, rather than as a means of destroying the Allied forces. Guderian did not lose focus of the strategic goal, but was frustrated throughout the campaign by a series of halt orders. Guderian's operational thinking, planning, and execution were based on his willingness to accept risk in order to keep his forces concentrated at the Schwerpunkt.
Guderian was often criticized and second-guessed by his superiors. Time and again, however, his skill in accurately assessing the situation proved his skeptics wrong.
Guderian had a knack for making sound and timely decisions when assessing the best employment of his forces. Once these decisions were made, he aggressively implemented them. Today's operational leaders could learn much about decision-making from Guderian's example. 28 Macksey, 211.
